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Abstract
Background: The performance of recommended control measures is necessary for quick and uniform infectious
disease outbreak control. To assess whether these procedures are performed, a valid set of quality indicators (QIs) is
required. The goal of this study was to select a set of key recommendations that can be systematically translated
into QIs to measure the quality of infectious disease outbreak response from the perspective of disaster emergency
responders and infectious disease control professionals.
Methods: Applying the Rand modified Delphi procedure, the following steps were taken to systematically select a
set of key recommendations: extraction of recommendations from relevant literature; appraisal of the
recommendations in terms of relevance through questionnaires to experts; expert meeting to discuss
recommendations; prioritization of recommendations through a second questionnaire; and final expert meeting to
approve the selected set. Infectious disease physicians and nurses, policymakers and communication experts
participated in the expert group (n = 48).
Results: In total, 54 national and international publications were systematically searched for recommendations,
yielding over 200 recommendations. The Rand modified Delphi procedure resulted in a set of 65 key
recommendations. The key recommendations were categorized into 10 domains describing the whole response
pathway from outbreak recognition to aftercare.
Conclusion: This study provides a set of key recommendations that represents ‘good quality of response to an
infectious disease outbreak’. These key recommendations can be systematically translated into QIs. Organizations
and professionals involved in outbreak control can use these QIs to monitor the quality of response to infectious
disease outbreaks and to assess in which domains improvement is needed.
Background
Infectious disease outbreaks are a global threat to public
health that can have a high economical and societal im-
pact [1,2]. During an outbreak, recommended control
measures need to be timely and uniformly performed to
curb the spread of pathogens and, ultimately, to reduce
the number of persons becoming infected [3].
Numerous documents -from various countries or re-
gions addressing various types of outbreaks- describe such
recommended or ‘good quality’ response to infectious
disease outbreaks. Unfortunately, publication and dis-
semination of scripts, guidelines and scientific advice
does not guarantee good quality outbreak response
[4-6]. Evaluations of recent crises show large variation
in the implementation of crisis advice and thus in the
quality of outbreak response. A Dutch study examining
the response to the Q-fever outbreak showed large re-
gional variance in the implementation of the nationally
advised measures [7]. Similarly, evaluation of the con-
trol measures during the early stages of the lympho-
granuloma venereum (LGV) outbreak in the various EU
countries showed great differences between countries
with respect to case definitions, laboratory testing and
antimicrobial drug treatment [8]. A study examining the
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causes of differences in the implementation of crisis advice
showed that among others, the various categories of profes-
sionals involved in outbreak control lacked clearly defined
measures to monitor the execution of ‘key actions’ [9].
Quality indicators (QIs) can be used to gain insight
into the quality of response and, even more importantly,
they can be used to measure the effects of interventions
aimed at improving response [10]. In this manner, QIs
provide a tool to systematically monitor response qual-
ity. Two studies developed QIs for infectious disease
outbreak response describing the major domains of out-
break response [11,12]. Both studies lack transparency
and reproducibility because they do not provide insight
into among others; the selected literature, selected ex-
perts and the definition of consensus. It is important
that QIs are developed in a systematic and transparent
way [10,13,14], which to our knowledge has not been
done for infectious disease outbreaks.
The goal of this study was therefore to select a set of
key recommendations that can be systematically trans-
lated into QIs to measure the quality of infectious dis-
ease outbreak response from the perspective of disaster
emergency responders and infectious disease control
professionals (ID-control professionals) using a valid
development procedure. We aimed to develop a generic
set of key recommendations that can be used to measure
the quality of outbreak response, irrespective of the
causative pathogen.
Methods
We used the systematic RAND modified Delphi method
to develop and select -in a multistep approach (see Step1
through 5 below)- a set of key recommendations repre-
senting good quality infectious disease outbreak re-
sponse [15]. In this iterative method the individual
opinion of experts is aggregated into group consensus.
Recommendations for infectious disease outbreak re-
sponse were extracted from the literature, and presented
to a multidisciplinary expert panel. The panel achieved
consensus on a set of key recommendations during two
questionnaire rounds and two face-to face consensus
meetings. Formal ethical approval from a medical ethical
committee was not required for this research in the
Netherlands since it does not entail subjecting partici-
pants to medical treatment or imposing specific rules of
conduct on participants. All the experts consented to
participate in the study and were aware that their re-
sponses would be used for research purposes.
Table 1 Medline search strategy
The gold standard search strategy of the Cochrane
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care group
(http://epoc.cochrane.org/)
Communicable diseases OR Indicator* OR
communicable disease, Measurab* OR
Emerging OR Performance Measure*
disease outbreaks OR OR
Crisis Performance
Assessment* OR
AND Quality Assessment* OR
Quality Measure* OR
Risk Assessment OR Manage* OR
Contact Tracing OR Recommend* OR
Disease notification OR Disease Management OR
Infection Control OR Organization OR
Mandatory Testing OR Administration OR
Universal Precautions OR Scientific AND Advice
Population Surveillance OR
Immunization OR OR
Quality Management
Quality indicators,
OR Healthcare
Bioterrorism OR
Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome
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Step 1 – Literature search and extraction of
recommendations
We performed a literature search using the Medline data-
base to review the international literature for information
about quality indicators and recommendations for good
quality response to an infectious disease outbreak from
the year 2007 (search executed 4th week of February
2012). Table 1 shows the search strategy in which we
combined the gold standard search strategy of the
Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care
Group to identify quality improvement studies and
combined these (http://epoc.cochrane.org/) with terms
on outbreaks and performance measurement. Two re-
searchers (EB and AT) independently examined title
and abstract of the publications to include any publica-
tion (for example outbreak reports, evaluations,
health services research studies, guidelines) potentially
describing recommendations for ID-control profes-
sionals and disaster emergency responders. Exclusion cri-
teria were: publications that were not about infectious
disease outbreaks (non outbreak setting or no acute out-
break like HIV), publications describing recommendations
for a hospital setting, publications that were setting/region
or patient specific, and publications that described simula-
tions or mathematical models of outbreaks.
Next, we collected grey literature, i.e. Dutch docu-
ments on good quality response including national guid-
ance, national outbreak advice, contracts between health
care organizations and disaster care plans. We also in-
cluded national evaluations of recent infectious disease
crises such as Q-fever and the 2009 flu pandemic. The
inclusion of grey literature was made on the basis of rec-
ommendations from national specialists on infectious
disease preparedness- and control who were asked to
judge appropriateness.
Two researchers (EB and MHi) performed the extrac-
tion of recommendations independently on a sample con-
sisting of 25% of all selected sources (literature review and
grey literature). The researchers extracted good quality re-
sponse recommendations from the selected literature. Dis-
crepancies between the two researchers were discussed
until consensus was reached. After reaching consensus on
this 25% sample, one researcher continued to extract rec-
ommendations from the remaining selected literature (EB).
The two researchers examined the total set of recommen-
dations to remove identical recommendations.
All recommendations were discussed with the main
researchers involved in this study (MHu, JH, AT, EB) in
two meetings. In these meetings we selected in consensus
and while applying the inclusion criteria, existing generic
recommendations or aggregated pathogen and disease
specific recommendations, which were subsequently pre-
sented to the participants in the expert panels during the
next stages.
Step 2 – First questionnaire round
The consensus procedure took place between September
2012 and May 2013. We approached all 25 public health
regions from the Netherlands by e-mail and invited
public health infectious disease experts from their re-
gion to participate in the expert group. Our expert
panels consisted of 48 Dutch experts in public health
(28 ID-control professionals and 20 disaster emergency
responders) who all had experience in the prepared-
ness and/or control of an infectious disease outbreak.
All regions were represented.
Two digital Limesurvey (a digital open source survey
application) questionnaires were composed, one for the
ID-control professionals and one for the disaster emer-
gency responders. In this process, recommendations
were assigned to the responsible organization in the
Netherlands: logistical support recommendations were
presented to disaster emergency responders and infectious
disease control recommendations were presented to
ID-control professionals. In the Netherlands, the disaster
emergency responder tasks lay with charge of logistical
support of outbreak control while the coordination of out-
break measures is a responsibility of the ID-control ex-
perts. This, of course, can be different in other countries.
Both expert groups followed a parallel, methodologic-
ally identical path: each expert group assessed the rec-
ommendations regarding their expertise on relevance.
Relevance was graded by the experts in response to the
following question; “To what extent do you consider this
recommendation as a relevant element for measuring
the quality of infectious disease outbreak response?” on a 9-
point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree). Ex-
perts could comment on recommendations and could add
recommendations. Recommendations were accepted or fur-
ther processed based on the RAND/University of California
at Los Angeles agreement criteria [15]. Relevance scores
were calculated for each item. If the recommendation had a
median of 8 or 9 and >70% of the experts scored in the top
tertile, then the recommendation was marked as “accepted”.
If the recommendation had a median <8 and <70% scored
in the top tertile, then the recommendation was marked as
“not accepted” and was excluded. If the recommendation
had a median <8 and >70% of the experts scored in the top
tertile or the median was 8 or 9 and <70% of the experts
scored in the top tertile, then the recommendation was
marked as “to be discussed”.
In the second part of the questionnaire we checked
whether we assigned recommendations to the correct
responsible organization (disaster emergency responders
or ID-control experts). If more than 33% of the re-
sponders questioned the attribution of responsibility for
the action to a certain party, then the recommendation
was presented to the responsible organization in the sec-
ond questionnaire round.
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Step 3 – Consensus meeting
Both expert groups were invited for a separate face-to-
face consensus meeting in October 2012. The results of
the analysis of the questionnaires were sent to the ex-
perts in advance of the consensus meeting. During the
meeting, the expert panels could comment on recom-
mendations with the label “to be discussed”. As a result,
the discussed recommendations were found to be not
relevant or were modified and found relevant.
Step 4 – Second questionnaire round
In step 4, two responsible organization specific ques-
tionnaires were composed of all recommendations. To
categorize the recommendations, we combined two
frameworks which incorporate the main domains of
emergency response [16,17]. The recommendations
were categorized into 35 categories (25 for ID-control
experts and 10 for disaster emergency responders)
which described each step in the process of infectious
disease outbreak response. These 35 categories or sub-
domains represented 10 main domains: “Scale of the
outbreak and epidemiology”, “Control measures”,
“Diagnostics”, “Logistic support”, “Aftercare and con-
clusion”, “Communication”, “Logistics”, “Upscaling”,
“Coordination of the chain of outbreak control” and
“Continuity of care”.
Corrections on the assigned responsible organization
based on the first questionnaire were processed in this
second questionnaire. Doubles were removed if there was
too much resemblance of the recommendations within
one category. If a number of recommendations repre-
sented the same recommendation, but for different patient
groups (for example, confirmed case, contact of cases) the
recommendations were merged. We asked both expert
groups to prioritize the most important recommendation
per category, and we calculated the percentage of experts
that selected a recommendation. If more than 15 percent
of the experts selected a recommendation, the recommen-
dation was considered prioritized. Each group only priori-
tized recommendations regarding their own expertise.
Step 5 – Second consensus meeting
In a final, combined face-to-face expert meeting the ex-
perts were presented the combined selected sets of quality
indicators from step 4. Experts were asked to judge the
completeness of the selected recommendations. As a re-
sult, recommendations were textually modified, merged or
deleted.
Figure 1 Flowchart of included and excluded publications.
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Results
Step 1 – Literature search and selection of
recommendations
The Medline search for international literature regarding
quality indicators and recommendations for good quality
response to an infectious disease outbreak resulted in 151
unique publications (two identical publications were re-
moved), see Figure 1. Based on title and abstract, 106 of these
international publications were excluded while applying ex-
clusion criteria. The remaining 47 publications [18-64] were
read full text. From 11 [24,26,27,33,37,38,48,51,58,60,64]
out of these 47 articles, we extracted 35 recommenda-
tions. The national specialists on infectious disease
preparedness- and control plans provided 43 grey litera-
ture documents (see Additional file 1), from which we
extracted 1057 recommendations. In total, we extracted
1092 recommendations from both the international and
the grey literature.
After removal of doubles and of recommendations that
were not executed by ID-control professionals and disaster
emergency responders, 656 recommendations remained of
which 35 were extracted from the international literature.
These recommendations were discussed with all re-
searchers involved in this study to make the recommenda-
tions generic so that they apply to all outbreaks irrespective
of the nature of the causative pathogen and removed dou-
bles while applying the inclusion criteria. This resulted in
226 recommendations (155 for ID-control professionals
and 71 for disaster emergency responders). Figure 2 dis-
plays the results from the consensus procedure.
Step 2 – First questionnaire round
Forty-four experts returned the first questionnaire (re-
sponse rate 92%) containing the 226 recommendations
resulting from step 1. After applying the RAND/University
of California at Los Angeles agreement criteria, the first
consensus round resulted in 138 “accepted” recommen-
dations. Thirty-eight recommendations were found “not
accepted”, and therefore excluded. Thirty-one recom-
mendations were marked as “to be further processed in
the second questionnaire”.
Both the “accepted” recommendations and the “to be
further processed in the second questionnaire” rec-
ommendations (N = 169) were subsequently included
Figure 2 Selection of key recommendations for quality indicators by the RAND modified Delphi procedure.
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in the second questionnaire (discussed further in step
4). Nineteen recommendations were marked “ to be dis-
cussed ”, meaning that the experts did not reach consen-
sus on the relevance or non-relevance of the items. These
recommendations were further assessed in step 3.
Step 3 – Consensus meeting
In the third step, the expert panels could comment on
recommendations with the label “to be discussed” in a
consensus meeting. Fourteen ID-control professionals
(14 out of 28) and 16 disaster emergency responders (16
out of 20) attended the consensus meeting. The ID-
control professionals discussed nine recommendations,
of which one was found not relevant, seven were found
relevant after textual modification and one was found
relevant without modification.
The disaster emergency responders discussed ten recom-
mendations of which two were found not relevant. Two
recommendations were combined into one and as a result,
seven recommendations were found relevant after textual
modification.
In total fifteen recommendations were accepted for
further assessment.
Step 4 - Second questionnaire round
Recommendations were combined into one if the rec-
ommendations represented the same action but a differ-
ent target group (for instance management of suspected
case, case, confirmed case). This resulted in a reduction
from 184 to 160 recommendations. The prioritization
questionnaire consisted of 160 recommendations, of
which 31 had to be appraised by both the disaster emer-
gency responders and the ID-control professionals as in
practice both could be made responsible for performing
the recommended activity.
Forty experts returned the second questionnaire (re-
sponse rate 88.9%). As a result, the ID-control professionals
selected 55 recommendations, the disaster emergency re-
sponders 21. In some cases both types of experts prioritized
the same recommendation. Deleting those resulted in 69
unique recommendations from both expert groups.
Step 5 – Second consensus meeting
In the final consensus meeting, both expert panels were
merged. Seventeen experts (17 out of 48) attended the
consensus meeting. The group discussed the 69 recom-
mendations resulting from step 4. Three recommenda-
tions were deleted, 1 newly added and 4 combined into
2. This resulted in 65 recommendations divided among
10 main domains (Table 2): Scale of the outbreak and
epidemiology (n = 2), Control measures (n = 22), Diag-
nostics (n = 9), Logistical support (n = 4), Aftercare and
conclusion (n = 2), Communication (n = 5), Logistics
(n = 6), Upscaling (n = 5), Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control (n = 6) Continuity of care (n = 4).
Discussion
In this study, we selected a set of 65 key recommenda-
tions describing good quality of infectious disease out-
break response, based on scientific and grey literature,
while applying the systematic Rand modified Delphi pro-
cedure. We selected key recommendations for the broad
range of tasks in infectious disease outbreak response,
from “control measures” and “diagnostics” to processes
such as “coordination of the chain of outbreak control”.
These recommendations can be systematically translated
into a set of quality indicators. This QI set is a valuable
tool to monitor the quality of response to infectious
disease outbreak irrespective of the pathogen, and to as-
sess in which domains improvement is needed. To our
knowledge, no generic QIs have been systematically de-
veloped to measure the quality of infectious disease out-
break response from the perspective of disaster
emergency responders and ID-control professionals de-
scribing the whole process of infectious disease outbreak
response.
Two studies previously developed QIs applicable to
some specific components of outbreak response [11,12].
One study focused on organizational aspects like vaccine
availability, communication and reporting [11], while the
other study focused on the correct and timely detection
of the first cases and the initiation of prophylaxis, educa-
tion and advice to healthcare workers [12]. Although
there is some resemblance between the domains selected
in these two studies and our study, our key recommen-
dations are more detailed and specific, which is crucial
for a valid and reliable assessment of quality but also for
selecting targets for improvement.
Our study has some strengths and limitations. The
strength is that our panels consisted of 26 and 18 ex-
perts with ample experience in outbreak control, ensur-
ing optimal face validity of the key recommendations.
Literature describes that 7–15 experts per panel are
needed in order to develop a reliable set of indicators,
[15]. The experts brought expertise from various fields
such as: infectious disease control, policy making, public
health administration, contingency planning, public
health nursing, and had been involved in regional and
national meetings regarding infectious disease control.
Diversity of expert panel members leads to consideration
of different perspectives and a wider range of alterna-
tives [65].
Preferably, key recommendations are selected combin-
ing evidence- and consensus based recommendations,
with a strong preference for evidence based [14]. A limi-
tation of our study is that, from the 656 recommenda-
tions which served as a basis for the first questionnaire
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Table 2 Selected key recommendations*
Domain Quality indicator
Scale of the outbreak and
epidemiology
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] collects data about all cases and contacts of cases for inclusion in the case
register of the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] if the nature and phase of the outbreak are such that the data are
relevant to outbreak control
Scale of the outbreak and
epidemiology
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] reports the data about the index case, the epidemiological situation (number
and nature of the contacts, possible source, etc.) to the National Authority in charge of infectious disease control
for national surveillance and coordination
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] is in charge of supplying prophylaxis for the designated groups
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] informs the supervisory pharmacy about delivery of the prophylactic
medication by the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION]. The pharmacist helps set up the medication management
system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] must register the indications and contraindications of the prophylactic
medication by name and national insurance number of the person receiving treatment whenever the
[RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides prophylaxis
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] informs the supervising pharmacy about any delivery of medicaments by the
[RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION]. The pharmacist helps set up the medication management system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] must register the indications and contraindications for the medication for
treatment by name and national insurance number of the person receiving treatment when the [RESPONSIBLE
ORGANISATION] is in charge of the treatment
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] vaccinates only the groups with an indication for vaccination in as far as the
[RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] gives the vaccination
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] obtains a list of the residents in the outbreak area (the target population)
and approaches them whenever this is necessary**
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] informs the supervisory pharmacy about any vaccine delivery by the
[RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION]. The pharmacist helps set up the medication management system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] looks after registering the indications and contraindications for the vaccine
by name and national insurance number of the person receiving vaccination whenever the [RESPONSIBLE
ORGANISATION] gives the vaccinations
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] organises quarantine for contacts of cases, people belonging to the risk
group, and other healthcare professionals, with adherence to the national guidelines
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] verifies whether quarantine for contacts of cases, people belonging to the
risk group, and other healthcare professionals was carried out with adherence to the national guidelines
Control measures Within the agreed time span, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] must make available a fully equipped
quarantine facility that meets the current requirements starting from the moment that the need of such a facility
was made known
Control measures With adherence to the national guidelines, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] places cases and people with
symptoms in isolation
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] verifies whether the national guidelines were adhered to when cases and
people with symptoms were placed in isolation at home
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] is in charge of monitoring the medical condition of any suspected case and
contacts of cases by telephone and asks the person about his/her symptoms with a view to the causative
pathogen. Thus quick action can be taken, should there be any indication that this person has been infected
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] instructs people exposed to infection to register themselves with the
appropriate caretaker if they develop any symptoms (e.g. flu-like symptoms such as fever and conjunctivitis)
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] ensures that people with symptoms, people belonging to the risk group,
contacts of cases, and other healthcare professionals receive instruction about the appropriate measures to
prevent infection in consultation with the treating medical practitioner
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] instructs the general population about the appropriate measures for
controlling infection
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] instructs the carrier how to transport cases in conformance with the national
guidelines
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] instructs its employees to take the prescribed protection measures the way
the national guidelines recommend
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] informs other health care professionals about personal protection measures
conforming to the national guidelines
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Table 2 Selected key recommendations* (Continued)
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] checks whether its employees use the prescribed protection measures the
way the national guidelines recommend
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides for the correct diagnostics for cases, contacts of cases, people
belonging to the risk groups, and people who meet the case definition criteria as determined in the national
guidelines
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] makes arrangements with general practitioners (GPs) and the local medical
microbiology laboratory for routing the diagnostics
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] takes charge of diagnostics and any additional control measures (conferring
with the consultant microbiologist and the GP)
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] confers with the consultant microbiologist of the region in the event of an
infectious disease outbreak
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides storage of medical materials (e.g. medicines, medical equipment,
necessary research materials, and sterile materials) if national instructions to do so are given
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] distributes medical materials if national instructions to do so are given
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides triage based on the national criteria whenever there is a medical
indication for such triage
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides instruction to the medical interagency partners about the triage
criteria
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] organises specific areas (high-risk zones) for the transport, assessment, and
management of suspected or confirmed cases with adherence to current protocols (this monitoring measure
concerns the separation of patient flows)
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] has direct access to diagnostic material
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] documents where diagnostic materials can be ordered
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] continuously has a supply of the necessary materials in stock, in
conformance to the criteria, and determines where these materials can be ordered
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION], the fire department, and the police organise fire safety, security, and traffic
flow around mass-meeting sites, in conformance with the mass vaccination plan
Aftercare and conclusion When the crisis is over, each [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] evaluates the actions that the organisation itself
initiated
Aftercare and conclusion During the outbreak or soon afterwards, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] take the initiative to involve all
parties concerned in setting up a plan for aftercare
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] provides health education for people with symptoms, people belonging to
the risk group, cases, and contacts of cases
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] limits the number of people visiting infected or suspect locations, such as
businesses and student homes, as much as possible
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] adheres to the national communication guidelines
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] has a single leader and centrally directed communication during an outbreak
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] posts up-to-date advice, FAQs, and associated hygiene advice on its website
(for residents unfamiliar with the local language as well, if relevant) or states where this advice can be found
Logistics Among themselves, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATIONS] clearly mark out who is responsible for coordinating
and carrying out tasks in the context of infectious disease control
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] records the decision-making process
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] adheres to the division of tasks between the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION]
and the National Authority in charge of infectious disease control
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] makes and updates a prognosis of bottlenecks on the basis of gaps in care,
the attack rate, and the specific pandemic groups
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] works with adherence to the current procedure strategy
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATIONS] inform each other in a timely way about signals and events that may lead
to an infectious disease crisis
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] appropriately upscales if and when an infectious disease crisis occurs
Upscaling The Director of Public Health directs and coordinates the elements of the clinical pathway
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] makes an appraisal based on complexity (safety partners) and capacities (of
the supply chain partners) to scale with adherence to the Coordinated Regional Incident Procedure
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round, only 35 were extracted from the international lit-
erature. In addition, the recommendations are merely
practice and expert opinion based. Expert opinion is
considered to be the lowest degree of evidence [66]. This
is in line with Yeager et al., who studied the literature
and concluded that “the public health emergency pre-
paredness literature is dominated by nonempirical stud-
ies”. They also describe how only 15 percent of scientific
literature on infectious disease outbreaks concerns the
response to outbreaks [67]. Although this explains the
lack of evidence based recommendations in our study, at
the same time it stresses the importance of building a
knowledge base for ‘good quality’ response to infectious
disease outbreaks. Our set of key could be the starting
point for such methodologically sound empirical studies.
Another limitation of our study is that our results are,
for pragmatic reasons, based on judgments by Dutch ex-
perts and partly on Dutch grey literature which may re-
duce transferability to other countries. To reduce this
risk as much as possible, we used a large group of expe-
rienced experts with various backgrounds. In addition, a
considerable part of the Dutch grey literature is based
on documents issued by supranational institutions (e.g.
the WHO checklist, ECDC or CDC guidelines). We
therefore assume that our key recommendations de-
scribe essential elements of outbreak response and will
have an added value in improving efforts to deliver high
quality response to outbreaks. These key recommenda-
tions are formulated in such a way that they allow for
adaptation to fit the specific organizational structure of
different countries. Most countries have their own na-
tional guidelines. European countries lacking national
guidelines are very likely to use ECDC guidance instead
(such as the RAGIDA guidelines or guidance dissemi-
nated through Rapid Risk Assessments).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study provides systematically selected
key recommendations for good quality of infectious dis-
ease outbreak response. These recommendations can be
systematically translated into QI to measure the quality of
infectious disease outbreak response and to assess in
which domains improvement is needed. Their consequent
application will provide public health organizations with
Table 2 Selected key recommendations* (Continued)
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] composes a regional multidisciplinary team during a potential
outbreak situation
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] presents an analysis of expected bottlenecks in regional care to the
interagency medical and administrative partners of the multidisciplinary consultation team
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
The physician in charge of infectious disease control handles communications to external colleagues about
field-specific aspects, in as far as the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] is in charge of communication
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] agrees with all parties involved on a contact person for people with
symptoms, people belonging to the risk group, cases, contacts of cases, and other healthcare providers
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
If and when the National Outbreak Management Team has convened, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION]
organises a meeting with the regional crisis centre to discuss the results of the Administrative Coordination
Consultation that are made known by the National Authority in charge of infectious disease control
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATIONS] maintain permanent contact with each other
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] ensures from the beginning that communication with all parties involved is
clear, complete, and timely
Coordination of the chain of
outbreak control
In the early stages of an outbreak, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] organises a face-to-face consultation with all
the care partners. During this consultation, the expectations of each organisation are expressed and the assignment
of roles and tasks is determined
Continuity of care During an infectious disease crisis, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] maintains an overview of the current need
for care and care capacity
Continuity of care The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] consults with local GPs about the coordination of general practice care (24/7)
Continuity of care In coordination with the local care provider networks (for example GP networks and ambulance
networks), the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] consults with GPs about how long the upscaled
organisation of primary care will still suffice and from what time supplemental packages will be
necessary to guarantee continuity
Continuity of care In coordination with the local care provider networks (for example GP networks and ambulance
networks), the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATION] alerts all healthcare providers regarding continuation of
care and advises them to act in conformance with the agreements (e.g. for home care and nursing-
and-care settings)
*This table represents the selected set of key recommendations that can be systematically translated into Quality Indicators (QIs). For each key recommendation,
the responsible organization(s) should be determined prior to measuring the set.
**In the Netherlands, the municipality can provide public service organisations with the list of residents and the necessary contact details from the Municipal
Personal Records Database.
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knowledge on where improvement of outbreak response
is needed and how to prioritise the efforts to achieve opti-
mal and uniform outbreak control, in order to be prepared
for the next crisis.
The most successful indicators for quality improvement
are indicators that are measurable, have potential for feasible
improvement, are capable of detecting differences in scores
and therefore of discriminating between organizations and
are applicable to a large part of the population [14]. At
this moment, we are performing a study to test the measur-
ability of our set of key recommendations in practice.
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